Exploring links between language and cognition in autism spectrum disorders: Complement sentences, false belief, and executive functioning.
A growing body of work indicates a close relation between complement clause sentences and Theory of Mind (ToM) in children with autism (e.g., Tager-Flusberg, & Joseph (2005). In Astington, & Baird (Eds.), Why language matters for theory of mind (pp. 298-318). New York, NY, US: Oxford University Press, Lind, & Bowler (2009). Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 39(6), 929). However, this link is based primarily on success at a specific complement clause task and a verbal false-belief (FB) task. One cannot exclude that the link found between these tasks may be a by-product of their both presupposing similar levels of language skills. It is also an open question if the role of complementation in ToM success is a privileged one as compared to that of other abilities which have been claimed to be an important factor for ToM understanding in autism, namely executive functioning (EF) (Pellicano (2007). Developmental Psychology 43, 974). Indeed the role played by complementation may be conceived of as an indirect one, mediated by some more general cognitive function related to EF. This study is the first to examine the relation between theory of mind assessed both verbally and non-verbally and various types of complement clause sentences as well as executive functions in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Our participants included 17 children and adolescents with ASD (aged 6 to 16) and a younger TD control group matched on non-verbal IQ (aged 4 to 9 years). Three tasks assessing complements of verbs of cognition, verbs of communication and verbs of perception were conducted. ToM tasks involved a verbal ToM task (Sally-Anne, Baron-Cohen et al. (1985). Cognition, 21(1), 37) as well as a non-verbal one (Colle et al. (2007). Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 37(4), 716). Indexes of executive functions were collected via a computerized version of the Dimensional Change Card-Sorting task (Frye et al., 1995). Standardized measures of vocabulary, morphosyntax and non-verbal IQ were also administered. Results show similar performance by children with ASD and TD controls for the understanding of complement sentences, for non-verbal ToM and for executive functions. However, children with ASD were significantly impaired for false belief when this was measured verbally. For both ASD and TD, correlations controlling for IQ were found between the verbal FB task and complement sentences of verbs of communication and cognition, but not with verbs of perception. EF indexes did not significantly correlate with either of the ToM tasks, nor did any of the general language scores. These findings provide support for the view that knowledge of certain specific types of complement clause may serve as a privileged means of 'hacking out' solutions to verbal false belief tasks for individuals on the autistic spectrum. More specifically, complements with a truth-value that is independent of that of the matrix clause (i.e. those occurring with verbs of cognition and of communication, but not of perception) may describe a false event while the whole sentence remains true, making these linguistic structures particularly well suited for representing the minds of others (de Villiers, 2007). Readers will be able to (1) describe and evaluate the hypothesis that complement sentences play a privileged role in false belief task success in autism; (2) describe performance on complement sentences, executive functioning and false belief tasks by children with autism as compared to IQ-matched peers; (3) explain which types of complements specifically relate to false belief task performance and why; and (4) understand that differences in performance by children with autism at different types of false-belief tasks may be related to the nature of the task conducted and the underlying mechanisms involved.